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INTRODUCTION
The invitation to explore “the new ‘illegitimacy’” necessarily evokes
reflections about the “old” status or institution that supplies the point of
departure. “Illegitimacy”1 holds particular fascination for me because my
encounter with this concept in law school introduced me to an idea that
now informs much of my teaching and scholarship: law, as one aspect of
∗
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the conference on “The New ‘Illegitimacy’: Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not
Depend on Marriage” at American University Washington College of Law, March 2526, 2011; the thoughtful comments of Adrienne Davis, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
Melissa Murray, and Laura Rosenbury in response to earlier drafts; a valuable
exchange with Anders Walker about his historical research; and the excellent research
assistance of Alexis Farris. Finally, given the story that I tell at the beginning of this
Article about how my study of family law in 1971 has shaped so much of my teaching
and scholarship, I thank Herma Hill Kay—the professor in that course and, in the years
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1. The term “illegitimacy” conveys an opprobrium that many contemporary
scholars reject. I count myself among them. Nonetheless, I use the term in this Article,
and not always with quotation marks, because of its history and the invitation of this
symposium to reflect on this history.
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the broader culture, constructs identity. Many years would follow before I
understood that law and culture construct a host of identities beyond
illegitimacy and legitimacy, such as gender, race, sex, and sexualities.
Nonetheless, my study of illegitimacy as a second-year student stands out
as my first glimpse of this particular function of law.
The 1971 family law course that introduced me to this revelatory idea
used a casebook that emphasized illegitimacy. Published in 1966, Cases
and Materials on Family Law by Caleb Foote, Robert J. Levy, and Frank
A.E. Sander envisioned what they entitled “The Problem of Illegitimacy”
as a microcosm in which the themes, tensions, and values pervading the
entire course played out.2 Accordingly, the editors devoted an entire 169page first chapter to this topic, with separate sections of the chapter
addressing such matters as public support of illegitimate children (welfare,
then the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program),3 the
“disposition of illegitimate children” (including surrender for adoption),4
and procedural issues in disputed paternity cases (for example, the use of
lie detector tests).5 The combination of this material with several important
illegitimacy cases decided by the Supreme Court after the casebook’s
publication,6 but assigned as supplementary reading, made coverage of this
topic the centerpiece of the entire semester, commanding far more class
sessions and attention than, say, requirements for a valid marriage or
divorce.
The editors’ treatment of the topic made plain a point that too often
seems invisible or forgotten today, now that conventional wisdom
identifies equality for children as the principal lesson of the demise of the
old illegitimacy: illegitimacy—like the larger field of family law that has
traditionally encompassed it—operates, by design, to regulate sex. Hence,
2. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 7 (Caleb Foote et al. eds., 1966)
(“[T]he law of illegitimacy typifies the whole subject of family law . . . .”).
3. See id. at 66-71. In 1996, welfare reform replaced Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)) (codified as amended in
scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.); see also infra note 72 and accompanying text
(suggesting that the contemporary preoccupation with “personal responsibility” gave
rise to the enactment of the 1996 federal welfare reform).
4. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 128-69.
5. See id. at 54-65.
6. E.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1971) (upholding, under the
Equal Protection Clause, the exclusion of children acknowledged by unmarried fathers
from inheriting by intestate succession); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection Clause, Louisiana’s
statute denying recovery for the wrongful death of children born outside marriage);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1968) (invalidating, under the Equal Protection
Clause, Louisiana’s statute that excluded children born outside marriage from
recovering for the wrongful death of their mother, while allowing children born to
married women to recover).
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for example, the casebook chapter on “The Problem of Illegitimacy” also
included excerpts from the Kinsey Reports surveying contemporary sexual
behavior,7 references to the assumed neuroses of many sexually active
unmarried women,8 and data on the high rate of nonmarital pregnancies
ending in illegal abortion.9 Such additional materials contextualize legal
issues concerning the treatment of children born outside of marriage,
reminding us of illegitimacy’s crucial role in a larger regulatory project
aimed at sex.
This Article’s analysis of illegitimacy brings the focus back to sex. In
doing so, this Article illuminates modern understandings of parentage and
contemporary theories of family law. Without explicit consideration of
adult sexual behavior as an important site of regulation, readings of the
Supreme Court’s case law on illegitimacy remain incomplete. Only by
giving a prominent place in the analysis to the state interest in regulating
sex, particularly heterosexual intercourse, can we reconcile this case law
with the doctrinal differences between the parentage rules for children
conceived sexually outside marriage and those for children conceived
without sex, by assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), outside
marriage. The sex/no sex10 “dividing line”11 that emerges demonstrates
why returning the regulation of sex to the center of family law has far more
explanatory power than alternative understandings of the field, such as
theories that emphasize children’s equality or the privatization of
dependency.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I revisits the earlier understanding
of illegitimacy, highlighting its emphasis on sexual morality. Part II
explores the Supreme Court’s (partial) repudiation of the construct,
offering several different readings of the case law centered on, respectively,
children’s equality, parental identification, and personal responsibility.
Part III tests these readings by examining their application in cases about
two classes of children born outside marriage: those conceived by sexual
intercourse, on the one hand, and those conceived by ARTs, on the other—
raising questions reminiscent of the “old illegitimacy.” For the answers to
these questions, this Part then turns to the state’s interest in regulating sex,
7. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, supra note 2, at 84-88 (citing ALFRED
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 287-304 (1953), and
PAUL H. GEBHARD ET AL., PREGNANCY, BIRTH, AND ABORTION 78, 161, 178 (1958)).
8. See id. at 138, 141-42, 144 (discussing how social workers encounter many
complex problems in assisting unwed mothers and address various psychological
pressures and problems facing such clients).
9. See id. at 112 (indicating that up to ninety percent of nonmarital pregnancies
end by induced abortion, as suggested by a study conducted by the Kinsey Institute).
10. For the meaning of this shorthand, see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
11. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 126 (2008) (criticizing marriage as the wrong “dividing
line”).
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which harmonizes the seemingly inconsistent rules of parentage for the two
groups of children while highlighting the policy choices that always
underlie such rules. The Conclusion emphasizes how any regime of
parentage necessarily creates illegitimacy of one form or another.
Throughout, this Article shows how illegitimacy continues to provide a
lens for examining the basic doctrines, theories, and constructed identities
animating family law—just as it did forty years ago.
I. “THE OLD ILLEGITIMACY” AND ITS MESSAGE ABOUT SEXUAL
MORALITY
Illegitimacy has always, by design, operated as a means of regulating sex
and, in turn, conveying a moral message about sex. It has accomplished
these objectives in several ways. First, illegitimacy has served family law’s
“channeling function,”12 seeking to confine sexual activity within marriage
by creating a disfavored status for children conceived and born outside
marriage.13 Second, its doctrinal and evidentiary supports—such as the
presumption of legitimacy14 and Lord Mansfield’s Rule15—have covered
up illicit sex, by treating a married woman’s offspring as the children of her

12. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 498-500 (1992) (examining marriage and parenthood to illustrate family
law’s “channelling function,” which “supports social institutions which are thought to
serve desirable ends”); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally
Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 276-85 (2008)
(“Today, family law claims to not repress sex, but to ‘channel’ it into marriage.”).
13. See Brief for the Attorney General, state of Louisiana as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 4-5, 7-8, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508),
1968 WL 112828 (asserting that one method of encouraging marriage is to confer
greater rights to legitimate offspring than illegitimate offspring). For a glimpse of the
evolution of academic treatment of illegitimacy before the Supreme Court intervened,
compare Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477,
477-82 (1967) (summarizing the rights afforded nonmarital children on the eve of
Court’s 1968 decision in Levy v. Louisiana), with Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the
Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 215, 215 (1939) (describing “the bastard” as “a
living symbol of social irregularity, an undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in
short, a problem—a problem as old and unsolved as human existence itself”).
14. According to this presumption, often described as one of the strongest known
to law, a mother’s husband is the father of her children. To the extent that some
jurisdictions made the presumption conclusive, it operated as a substantive rule of law,
not as an evidentiary or procedural guide. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 117-20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (examining a California statute that
“indisputably presumed” children to be “of the marriage” when the mother is
cohabiting with her husband, who is neither impotent or sterile); Susan Frelich
Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the SameSex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 232-34 (2006) (“[W]e might think of the
presumption of legitimacy as a default rule that determines parentage in the absence of
further action, whether an attempt to rebut the presumption (in those circumstances
permitting rebuttal) or proceedings to transfer parental rights to another.”).
15. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 119 (1971)
(noting that Lord Mansfield’s rule “denies spouses the right to testify as to the
illegitimacy of a child born in their marriage”).
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husband, even when he is not the genetic father.16 Illegitimacy has long
made marital sex normative and everything else second-class at best and
deviant at worst.
Illegitimacy’s moral message is unmistakable, as the following examples
demonstrate.
Consider,
for
instance,
that
in
its
heyday
illegitimacy/legitimacy did not constitute a simple binary, but a
complicated hierarchy with “adulterine bastards” and “incestuous bastards”
the lowest of the lot.17 An especially disfavored category that developed in
the United States was that of the “miscegenous bastard.”18 Thus, the
immorality of birth outside marriage was a matter of degree reflected in the
classification system. In turn, not only social, but also economic,
disadvantages imposed on the child hinged on his or her particular
category.19
A second illustration of illegitimacy’s moral message emerges from the
story of how officials in southern states in the United States deployed
illegitimacy for their own race-based ends in the years following Brown v.
Board of Education.20 In doing so, they not only constructed identities
based on marriage, sex, and immorality, but they constructed race and
racial identities as well. Legal historian Anders Walker documents how
white opponents of desegregation seized on the notion that they could use
immorality as a proxy for the race of those whom they sought to confine to
separate schools, not directly challenging Brown, but circumventing its
impact.21 Accordingly, they developed pupil placement laws designed “to
keep black children out of white schools based on questions of moral
16. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 201-02 (1985) (explaining how early English
common law, through the presumption, elevated children’s interests and family
integrity over paternal rights).
17. KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 2; see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (plurality
opinion) (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE BASTARDY (1836)); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE
SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED 89
(2009) (noting how medieval canon law recognized five classes of illegitimates,
determined by “the severity of the sexual sin of their parents”).
18. KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 2. This was so even though earlier, during slavery,
the mixed-race offspring born to slave mothers, often from forcible rapes by the master,
were regarded as valuable property belonging to him. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 2329 (1997) (identifying the “essence” of black women’s experiences during slavery as
the “brutal denial of autonomy over reproduction,” with female slaves helping to
reproduce the master’s labor force).
19. See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 77 (challenging the possible justifications
for “giving the extramarital child lesser economic rights than are given the premarital
illegitimate”) (emphasis in original).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES
USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 3-9 (2009); see also
Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L.
REV. 73, 107-09 (2003) (noting the “convergence of race, sex, and class,” including the
use in the 1960s of illegitimacy “as a proxy for race in implementing public policy”).
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background,”22 with the legal identities of illegitimate and legitimate as
valuable props in this undertaking.
In attempting to make this strategy for replicating pre-Brown segregation
ever more effective, Walker explains, political leaders in these southern
states worked to abolish common law marriage and thus increase the
number of children deemed illegitimate, knowing the impact of such moves
would fall more heavily on African Americans than on their white
counterparts.23 They understood that far more black children than white
children would be unable to produce documents showing the formal
marriage of their parents. They also understood that, when white women
became pregnant outside marriage, they typically surrendered the children
for adoption—usually in secrecy in order to protect their own moral
reputations and those of their families from the opprobrium of sexual
transgression.24 Once adopted by married couples, then, these white
children were deemed legitimate and thus cleansed of the stigma of
immorality generated by their status at birth.25 By contrast, black children
born outside marriage were usually reared by their mothers and extended
families, thus increasing illegitimacy rates in this segment of the
population.26
In addition to these measures, consciously designed to boost black
illegitimacy rates and thus provide an alternative basis for preserving
racially segregated schools, southern political leaders explored other
punitive interventions—all centered on illegitimacy. These included
proposed laws that would require sterilization of a woman after she gave
birth to one illegitimate child, deem illegitimate children abandoned and
neglected, make having more than one illegitimate child a crime, trigger
22. WALKER, supra note 21, at 41.
23. For an examination of the different approaches to pregnancies outside

marriage, before legalized abortion, in the white and African-American communities,
see RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE
ROE V. WADE (1992).
24. See ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V.
WADE (2006) (presenting narratives from women who surrendered children for
adoption). Indeed, white babies were valuable commodities who would help white,
childless couples in this post-World War II era of “compulsory parenthood.” ELAINE
TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS AMERICANS AND THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 127-49 (1995) (documenting the post-war “baby craze” and that
era’s social pressures favoring parenthood).
25. WALKER, supra note 21, at 79-81 (showing how white unmarried mothers
could use maternity homes and adoption agencies that were unavailable to African
Americans). Adoption practice, then as now, replaces the child’s original birth
certificate with a new one showing the names of the adoptive parents. See Elizabeth J.
Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry Into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to
Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 375-78 (2001).
26. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 78 (citing TECHNICAL SUBCOMM. OF THE
COMM. ON CHILDREN & YOUTHS, N.C. CONFERENCE FOR SOCIAL SERV., THE PROBLEM
OF BIRTHS OUT OF WEDLOCK (1959)).
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investigations of families with illegitimate children, and limit public
assistance for families with illegitimate children.27 Other laws introduced
at this time were designed to increase the regulation of marriage licenses
and birth certificates, so that the former would be more difficult for African
Americans to obtain and the latter would allow the tabulation of
illegitimate births among African Americans.28 All of these initiatives
sought to emphasize the lack of sexual discipline and hence moral
inferiority of African Americans, justifying segregation.29
These manipulative attempts to maintain racial apartheid provide
important insights about illegitimacy as a legal and social construct. Even
if emphasizing the connections between race and nonmarital births
reflected nothing more than crass political opportunism, these efforts
highlight that sexual immorality constitutes the animating and taken-forgranted core of illegitimacy.30 Outside the South, this view gained
momentum as African-American communities and families were
marginalized as exemplars of what the federal Moynihan Report dubbed
the “culture of poverty”—a term that took particular aim at the unmarried
motherhood and welfare dependency seen as characteristic of urban
blacks.31 Accordingly, through the construct of illegitimacy, immorality
was linked not just to race, but also to economic dependency on the state.
Indeed, persistent emphasis on the low marriage rate of African-American
women has kept these ideas alive, even if the description of the problem
has changed over time.32
27. See id. at 77-82 (examining efforts in North Carolina in the late 1950s to deny
welfare benefits to nonmarital children).
28. See Anders Walker, Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised
Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47
DUKE L.J. 399, 410-18 (1997) (finding that adjusting the regulations on birth
certificates served to raise reported black illegitimacy levels and “discredit[] traditional
modes of black family formation”).
29. See WALKER, supra note 21, at 39-43 (documenting efforts in Mississippi in
the late 1950s to perpetuate segregation by taking aim at the moral background of
African-American students).
30. This seemingly obvious point is often eclipsed today by emphasis on other
aspects of illegitimacy, such as the unfairness of unequal treatment of children. See
infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
31. See OFFICE POLICY PLANNING & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, THE NEGRO
FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965) (often called “The Moynihan
Report” for short); see also Patricia Cohen, “Culture of Poverty” Makes a Comeback,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/us/18poverty.html
(“Although Moynihan didn’t coin the phrase, . . . his description of the urban black
family as caught in an inescapable ‘tangle of pathology’ of unmarried mothers and
welfare dependency was seen as attributing self-perpetuating moral deficiencies to
black people, as if blaming them for their own misfortune.”).
32. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARDS BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE?: HOW
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011) (urging
interracial marriage as the solution to the dismal same-race marriage prospects for
middle-class, educated black women); KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I
CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005)
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II. THE OLD ILLEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT: READING THE CASES
In 1968, the Supreme Court began to dismantle much of “the old
illegitimacy” in a series of cases finding “illogical and unjust” the
punishment of children for the sexual transgressions of their parents.33 For
example, in Levy v. Louisiana,34 the Court struck down Louisiana’s law
denying nonmarital children damages for the wrongful death of their
mother.35
Calling attention to the humanity and personhood of
“illegitimate children,”36 the Justices could find “no action, conduct, or
demeanor of theirs [that] is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the
mother.”37 Put differently, in Levy, the Court saw no reason why a
tortfeasor should avoid responsibility or the tort victims should forfeit
recovery simply based on birth outside marriage.38
Levy suggested that children have no control over whether their parents
engage in sex outside of marriage and that, thus, they do not deserve legal
disadvantages stemming solely from such parental behavior. Later cases,
however, articulated this principle expressly: “Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”39 Over the
years, this idea has become iconic, even if the sentence expressing it leaves
a number of assumptions unarticulated and unexamined.40
(explaining the rise of unmarried motherhood by documenting the value that poor
women attach to having children and the criteria that these women use for identifying
worthy marriage partners).
33. The Court first used the “illogical and unjust” language in Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972), which held that the denial of worker’s
compensation recovery to children born outside of marriage violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
34. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
35. Id. at 72.
36. Id. at 70 (“[I]llegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live,
and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause . . . .”).
37. Id. at 72.
38. See id. at 71 (emphasizing that illegitimate children should not be denied
constitutionally protected rights when they are subject to all of the responsibilities of
citizenship, including the obligation to pay taxes).
39. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
40. For example, the Court offered no support for its empirical claim that laws
disadvantaging children born outside marriage did not deter the sexual activities of
adults. Even if the number of children born outside marriage showed that deterrence
was not completely effective, the nonmarital birth rate might have been higher without
such legal disadvantages. Certainly, recent increases in the nonmarital birth rate might
support such inference. See infra note 102 and accompanying text (citing data showing
an increase from 5% in 1960 to 41% in 2008). Further, the Court’s language does not
disentangle the effort to discourage nonmarital sex from the pressure to marry should
such sex occur and result in conception, and even today the public discourse includes
conversations about whether parents should marry for the sake of their children. See,
e.g., Should Parents Marry for the Kids?, Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/30/shotgun-weddings-vs-
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A. The Children’s Equality Reading
It should come as no surprise that one reading of the Supreme Court’s
illegitimacy case law highlights the unfairness of penalizing children for
the choices and actions of their parents, in turn establishing a legacy that
makes equal treatment of children a recognized constitutional value.41 This
“children’s equality reading” provides the point of departure for this
symposium on “The New ‘Illegitimacy,’” which accepts as “an axiom of
modern family law[] [that] children should not suffer as a result of being
born to unmarried parents.”42
Indeed, this reading is so powerful and compelling that it lends itself to
applications well beyond marital status. Thus, for example, the majority
opinion in Plyler v. Doe43 invokes this reading of the Supreme Court’s
illegitimacy cases to overturn laws that would deny public schooling to
children who live in the United States as undocumented aliens, stating:
“Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by
acting against their children, legislation directing the onus of a parent’s
misconduct against his children does not comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice.”44 Of course, Plyler, like the illegitimacy
precedents upon which it relied, did not foreclose alternative means of
regulating “the conduct of adults” or discouraging “a parent’s
misconduct.”45
If the idea that children should not be penalized for the actions and
choices of their parents extends beyond marital status, as Plyler illustrates,
then questions arise about the limits of the children’s equality reading.
Surely, not every inequality tied to parental conduct raises arguments likely
to succeed under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, children’s
opportunities and futures under our current neoliberal regime,46 which
cohabitating-parents/. Finally, the Court’s sentence fails to examine the highly
gendered impact of laws disapproving of nonmarital sex, from which women bore a
disproportionate share of shame and stigma. See, e.g., FESSLER, supra note 24
(presenting narratives that document this double standard in the context of pressure for
unmarried white women to surrender their babies for adoption).
41. The emphasis on illegitimacy as an issue of children’s equality was a chosen
litigation strategy. See Davis, supra note 21, at 92-100 (describing how challenges
came to focus on children born outside marriage and this strategy succeeded in
achieving legal change, albeit limited).
42. The New “Illegitimacy”: Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not Depend on
Marriage, AM. U. WASH. C.L., http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/
2011/20110325.cfm (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
43. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
44. Id. at 220; see also id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Weber, 406 U.S. at
175 and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). This language moots the
unsubstantiated empirical claim in Weber. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text.
45. 457 U.S. at 220.
46. See, e.g., DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005)
(defining neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that
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couples parental autonomy with only a minimal government role in
meeting economic needs, depend largely on parental choices and conduct;
nonetheless, the Court has embraced such pluralism among families,47
despite the life-altering and differential impact on children.48
Wherever the outer bounds of the children’s equality reading might lie,
however, we might tentatively posit that the Court’s precedents require an
especially careful examination of laws tying a child’s access to benefits to
the circumstances of his or her birth. As the Court put it, “Obviously, no
child is responsible for his birth . . . .”49 Beyond this starting point,
however, the Court’s illegitimacy cases themselves suggest additional
readings that help trace out the contours of the principle of children’s
equality, as shown below.
B. The Parental Identification Reading
In the wake of Levy, which left room to debate the governing standard of
review,50 some commentators asserted that strict scrutiny should apply in
illegitimacy cases because discrimination based on birth status is “imposed
without regard to an individual’s actions or capacities and affect[s] persons
who have no more control over their birth status than the black man has
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private
property rights, free markets, and free trade,” with “the role of the state . . . to create
and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices”).
47. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (recognizing parental
authority over children, including decisions whether to institutionalize them for mental
health problems); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1973)
(upholding the Texas public school finance system based on each district’s property
taxes, despite disadvantages to children residing in poor districts); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 229-35 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents to exempt their
children from high school, despite the possible limitations on children’s future
opportunities).
48. See Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal
Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008) (positing the
tension between the commitments to equal opportunity and family autonomy, given
differences in economic class and their impact on children); see also, e.g., Robin West,
From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 1394, 1409 (2009) (critiquing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), based on
“the profoundly inadequate social welfare net and hence the excessive burdens placed
on poor women and men who decide to parent”).
49. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.
50. See John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the
Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2-19 (1969) (reviewing Levy and Glona to
conclude that they provide a basis for challenging any law imposing disadvantages
based on illegitimacy); see also Gareth W. Cook, Note, Bastards: Denial of Recovery
for Wrongful Death Based Solely on the Illegitimacy of Either Claimant or Decedent Is
a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1986);
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), 47 TEX. L. REV. 326,
329 (1969) (“[T]he Court in Levy held that the rights involved are basic civil rights
involving the intimate, familial relationship between mother and child, and implied that
the classification of illegitimates was, therefore, inherently suspect.”).
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over the color of his skin.”51 Notably, however, once the Court addressed
the issue directly, it chose intermediate scrutiny52—the same standard used
for sex-based discrimination.53
I have always understood this move, the choice of intermediate scrutiny,
to communicate two important points. First, like sex-based discrimination,
classifications of children based on the marital status of their parents often
reflect archaic and unfounded generalizations;54 these are especially unfair
to the children, who have no control over their parents’ behavior.
Certainly, the Supreme Court’s initial foray into this terrain—invalidating
Louisiana’s wrongful death provisions that refused to recognize the
mother-child relationship outside of marriage—reflected this rationale.55
Whatever the state’s interest in channeling the sexual behavior of adults
into marriage, the Court understood legal denial of the mother-child
relationship as a constitutionally insupportable means.
Second, however, by identifying intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate
standard of review, the Court indicated that sometimes “real differences”
justify classifications based on illegitimacy, just as in the Court’s view
sometimes such differences justify classifications based on sex.56 The most
51. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 50, at 6.
52. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 465 (1988) (using intermediate

scrutiny to invalidate, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute limiting the time
when children born outside marriage may sue to establish paternity and seek child
support). On the interplay between illegitimacy and sex-based discrimination, see
Davis, supra note 21.
53. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279, 282 (1979) (using intermediate
scrutiny to invalidate, under the Equal Protection Clause, a statute imposing alimony
obligations only on husbands, but not wives); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98,
210 (1976) (using intermediate scrutiny to invalidate, under the Equal Protection
Clause, different ages at which males and females may drink 3.2% beer).
54. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 651-53 (1975) (invalidating,
as a violation of equal protection, a provision of the Social Security Act that permitted
widows but not widowers to collect special benefits while caring for minor children).
Some of the most valuable cases in making the connection between sex-based
discrimination and discrimination based on parental marital status involve both. See,
e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (finding unconstitutional a law
that permitted adoptions without the consent of unmarried fathers, upon a showing of
the child’s best interests, while requiring such consent from mothers, whether married
or not, and married fathers).
55. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guarantee &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). These laws, refusing to recognize the mother-child
relationship, were unusual for their time even though, historically, children born
outside marriage were deemed “filius nullius” or “son of no one.” See KRAUSE, supra
note 15, at 3-4 (defining term). The NAACP’s amicus brief in Levy and Glona pointed
out the racial discrimination worked by the laws in question. See Brief for Harry D.
Krause & Jack Greenberg et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112827.
56. E.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 469-72
(1981) (plurality opinion) (citing females’ capacity to become pregnant as a difference
justifying gender-based statutory rape laws); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1004 (1984) (using the term “real differences”).
For critiques of such reasoning, see, for example, Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex
Discount, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1177 (2010) (“The Court’s concern about
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compelling candidate for a “real difference” applicable to children born
outside marriage seemed to be the challenge of identifying the father.57
Although the mother’s inevitable presence at birth eliminated any doubt
about her identity,58 the Court’s early opinions allude to “lurking problems
with respect to proof of paternity.”59 Even with the subsequent advent of
exacting DNA tests,60 however, the possibility remained that the man had
disappeared or the woman declined to provide evidence necessary to
identify him.61 Because the presumption of legitimacy (in some states a
conclusive rule62) always identified the father of children born to married
women,63 but no similar default rule applied to children born to unmarried
mothers, one could appreciate how the illegitimacy classification might
occasionally be rationalized in particular contexts.
Indeed, the Court has never said that all illegitimacy-based distinctions
must fall, and a number of unsuccessful challenges to such classifications
demonstrate the partial nature of the revolution.64 Melissa Murray’s
valuable contribution to this symposium contends that the presence or
illegitimate pregnancy seems to have blinded it to the harm in leaving boys unprotected
against sexual abuse, or to any inequality in allowing young men to have consensual
sex with older partners, while criminalizing all nonmarital sex by young women.”);
Law, supra, at 999-1001 (emphasizing that it is not just nature that imposes the burdens
of teenage pregnancy, but also “the social and legal ethos that makes women solely
responsible for nurturing the children they bear . . . .”).
57. KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 82. But see infra notes 198-228 and accompanying
text (challenging a purely genetic understanding of parentage).
58. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001) (“Fathers and mothers are not
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood.”). Contemporary
practices such as egg donation and gestational surrogacy challenge the assumption that
maternity is always obvious. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005);
Raftapol v. Raney, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011).
59. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S.
456, 461 (1988) (recalling this problem).
60. See, e.g., Clark, 486 U.S. at 465 (recognizing the development of “increasingly
sophisticated tests for genetic markers [that] permit the exclusion of over 99% of those
who might be accused of paternity, regardless of the age of the child”).
61. Federal law imposes on recipients of public assistance an obligation to
cooperate with state authorities in establishing paternity, with exceptions in certain
circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2006).
62. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (approving California’s then-conclusive presumption).
63. But see id. at 115 (noting that even the traditional conclusive presumption of
legitimacy recognized some exceptions, as illustrated by the codification challenged in
Michael H., which excluded cases in which the husband was impotent or sterile).
64. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978) (upholding the requirement of
a judicial order of filiation for a child to inherit from his unmarried father by intestate
succession); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (upholding the exclusion of
the relationship of unmarried fathers and children from preferences under federal
immigration law); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1971) (upholding the
exclusion of children acknowledged by unmarried fathers from inheriting by intestate
succession). For an examination of illegitimacy-based discriminations that persist
today, see Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination
Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011).
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absence of marriage-like behavior helps us sort the cases, explaining why
some challenges to illegitimacy classifications succeeded while others did
not.65 I agree that such analysis proves illuminating. I would take the
observation one step further, however, to point out that marriage-like
behavior often serves the additional purpose of identifying a child’s father,
based—of course—on a social understanding of “father” constructed in the
shadow of marriage (with more on this point to come later).66
Under this “parental identification reading” of the illegitimacy cases,
concern about the difficulty of identifying nonmarital fathers remains a
possible basis for laws distinguishing children born outside marriage from
their marital counterparts.67 According to this reading, once outlier laws
refusing to recognize for some purposes the seemingly obvious motherchild relationship had been put to rest, so that the term “filius nullius” or
“son of no one” no longer strictly applied,68 the focus of illegitimacy
reform became the recognition of the child’s second parent. Indeed,
according to some authorities, to say that a child is illegitimate is to say that
the child has only one parent.69
This view of what the Supreme Court was trying to accomplish in this
line of cases received an early boost with the 1973 Uniform Parentage
Act’s (UPA’s) proposed network of parentage presumptions, including
some applicable to children whose parents never married.70 These
corrective measures synthesize the children’s equality reading with the
parental identification reading, seeking to provide content for the former by
facilitating the identification of a child’s second parent.
C. The Personal Responsibility Reading
If the Supreme Court’s decisions and the 1973 UPA were childfocused—developments designed to help children of unmarried parents
achieve parity with other children—they also offered welcome changes for
the state itself, paving the way for the increasing privatization of
dependency. The identification and recognition of unmarried fathers as
parents helped to transform critiques about the “culture of poverty”71 into a
preoccupation with “personal responsibility,” a theme that suggests still
65. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012).
66. See infra notes 209-19 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56 (2001) (showcasing this assumption
by the majority in Nguyen).
68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
69. See H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 210 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J., concurring).
70. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (2001); see also
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23-24 (Supp. 2011)
(including presumptions in new, updated UPA).
71. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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another reading of the Supreme Court case law. This new preoccupation
culminated in the enactment, in 1996, of federal welfare reform,
specifically the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),72 which Congress enacted to replace the
more generous AFDC program with the more restrictive Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) system.73 TANF imposes work
requirements and time limits on public assistance, allows disincentives for
procreation, and strengthens measures to collect support from absent
parents.74 Today, we see the same phrase in “Personal Responsibility
Education,”75 the name for one of two federally funded sex education
programs.
What does “personal responsibility” mean? The phrase seeks to
communicate that participating in heterosexual intercourse has
consequences, at least the risk of legally imposed child support obligations,
as signaled by PRWORA’s emphasis on ever more aggressive measures to
impose and enforce such obligations.76 While marriage provides one way
to carry out such obligations, it is not the only way. One alternative entails
transfer payments between unmarried parents.
According to this
understanding, licit sex no longer refers exclusively to sex within marriage,
but also contemplates the use of birth control and/or financial support for
any resulting children.77 Put differently, more personal responsibility
means less government responsibility.
This “personal responsibility reading” of the illegitimacy-classification
72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)) (codified as amended
in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C.).
73. See supra note 3.
74. See ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 202-45; Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare
Reforms Promote Abortion: “Personal Responsibility,” “Family Values,” and the
Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155 (1996). On the role of the federal government in
this traditional matter of state family law, see Laura W. Morgan, A Shift in the Ruling
Paradigm: Child Support as Outside the Contours of “Family Law,” 16 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 195 (1999).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 713 (Supp. IV 2010); cf. id. § 710 (separate program for
abstinence education).
76. See, e.g., id. § 667 (state guidelines for child support awards); id. § 666(b)
(income withholding). These measures condition states’ receipt of federal funds on
meeting specific federal conditions. See also id. § 228 (federal Deadbeat Parents
Punishment Act).
77. See, e.g., NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES:
LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1-15 (2010) (describing a “blue
family” model). One can find echoes of “personal responsibility” talk in the
controversy over whether women, even those working for church-affiliated employers,
must have free access to contraception as part of federal health care reform. See, e.g.,
Lauren Brown Jarvis, Religious Liberty vs. Reproductive Liberty: A New Political
Minefield Pits Women Against the Church, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2012, 5:32
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lauren-brown-jarvis/religious-liberty-vsrepr_b_1285607.html.
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cases receives reinforcement from opinions spelling out the criteria for
constitutional protection of unmarried fathers’ parental status. These are
cases in which observers see at work a “biology plus” test78 that conditions
constitutionally protected parental rights for unmarried genetic fathers on
specified conduct, which typically includes financial support. For example,
in accepting Peter Stanley’s challenge to the Illinois law that omitted
unmarried fathers from the definition of “parent,” the Supreme Court noted
not only that he had “sired and raised” the children,79 but also that he had
supported them.80 By contrast, in ruling that unmarried father Jonathan
Lehr failed to meet the behavior-based test to earn the right to object to the
mother’s arrangement of a stepparent adoption, the Court juxtaposed
Lehr’s never having supported the child81 with the prospective stepfather’s
financial commitment, as evidenced by his marriage to the mother and his
adoption petition.82
The personal responsibility reading of the cases dismisses any notion
that a child of unmarried parents should be regarded as “filius populi” or
“son of the people,” entitled to public support, rather than “filius nullius” or
“son of no one.”83 In turn, with marriage as the basis for child support
duties out of the way, family law and policy could pursue in earnest the
goal of privatizing dependency in all families. Pursuit of this goal has
meant that, despite theoretical tension suggested by the “biology plus”
cases,84 biology alone suffices to make a sexually conceiving unmarried
father personally responsible for child support.85 Accordingly, today courts
78. See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 827-28 (2006) [hereinafter Jacobs, My Two Dads]
(reviewing case law from the Supreme Court that ties fathers’ rights to demonstrated
commitment and establishes a “biology plus” standard); Daniel C. Zinman, Note,
Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise His Infant Surrendered for
Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 975, 980 (1992) (using the term “biology plus” to
describe the criteria for constitutionally protected paternal rights in the Supreme
Court’s case law). On the judicial development of the “biology plus” doctrine, see
Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L.
Rev. 637 (1993); Melanie B. Jacobs, When Daddy Doesn’t Want to be Daddy
Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
193, 207-08 & n.69 (2004) [hereinafter Jacobs, Paternity Fraud Claims]; see also
Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 433
(2007) (contending that the Court used the attributes and rights of motherhood as the
model for the “biology plus” test for unmarried fathers).
79. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
80. Id. at 650 n.4.
81. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249, 252 (1983).
82. See id. at 259. See generally Murray, supra note 65.
83. Blackstone used both terms. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *459.
84. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
85. See Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution:
Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 101 (2004) (noting that, once an unmarried father has
paid child support, he is then well-positioned to meet the “biology plus” test in any
future dispute).
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consistently hold unmarried men responsible for child support for children
conceived during a sexual encounter on the same terms applicable to
married fathers,86 whether or not the father has yet developed any personal
relationship with the child.87 Moreover, this result obtains even when the
man made clear before intercourse his intent not to become a father, when
he received reasonable assurances that no conception would occur, and
sometimes even when he fell victim to “birth control fraud” or the
nonconsensual seizure of his ejaculate after the encounter.88 Courts in such
cases regard the man’s decision to engage in the sexual encounter as the
“cause” of the financial obligation89 and deem the man’s child support
obligations a rational response to legitimate state interests.90
Consistent with this causation-based approach, in 2005, in Elisa B. v.
Superior Court,91 the California Supreme Court upheld the child support
obligations of a biological mother’s former partner, recognizing her as a
second parent based on intent and conduct92 and finding “no reason why
86. See, e.g., Walsh v. Jodoin, 925 A.2d 1086, 1087 (Conn. 2007) (holding that
equal protection requires retroactive application of “family statutes [designed] to render
the support available to a child of unmarried parents equal to that provided to a child
whose parents have divorced”); Jackson v. Proctor, 801 A.2d 1080, 1090 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2002) (using the approach applicable to children of divorced parents to set a
support award for a child of never married parents because support calculations cannot
vary based on the parent’s prior marital status).
87. See Oren, supra note 85, at 117-18.
88. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); N.E. v. Hedges, 391
F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2004); Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461
(Haw. 2005); Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb.
22, 2005); State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Wallis v. Smith, 22
P.3d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983).
See generally Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father’s Right to Pursue a
Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045 (2005); Donald C.
Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 29 (2003); Brenda Saiz, Tort Law: Tort Liability When Fraudulent
Misrepresentation Regarding Birth Control Results in the Birth of a Healthy Child—
Wallis v. Smith, 32 N.M. L. REV. 549 (2002).
89. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[T]he
State played no role in the conception or birth of the child in this case, or in the
decisions that resulted in the birth of the child.”), aff’d 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); cf.
Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 173 (2003);
Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 Ga. L.
Rev. 649 (2008); Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child
Support, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 107, 129 (2008) (all exploring theoretical bases of child
support obligations). But see Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430 n.4 (affirming the district court
while correcting its statement that biology alone creates liability for child support:
“[The statute] thus does more than simply ‘confirm a biological fact’—it establishes
that the putative father is the legal father, which gives rise to legal consequences.”)
(emphasis in original).
90. See, e.g., Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430; Doe, 125 P.3d at 472.
91. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
92. The California Supreme Court had previously used this approach to resolve a
dispute between genetic and intended parents versus the gestational surrogate who had
agreed to carry the pregnancy for them. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1993) (resolving conflicting indicia of maternity by looking to intent after stating,
“[b]ut for [the parties’] acted-on intention, the child would not exist”).
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both parents of a child cannot be women.”93 Not coincidentally, the push
for this outcome came from the state itself, after Elisa’s partner and the
twins began receiving public assistance.94
Such developments reinforce the claim that the privatization of
dependency has become the central pillar of family law.95 According to
numerous analyses and critiques, family law’s doctrines, values, and
policies—from the channeling of sex into marriage to the elevated place of
both marriage and parental autonomy96—all contribute by design to a
regime in which the state has virtually no obligation for care-giving and
support of vulnerable young members of the population.97
Even if the strongest evidence for this hypothesis once lay in family
law’s emphasis on the marital family, certainly the modern rhetoric of
personal responsibility and its implementation reveal that keeping
dependency private is a policy that now extends well beyond marriage. As
modern family law recognizes increasingly diverse family forms,98 then, it
93. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666. See also H.M. v. E.T., 930 N.E.2d 206, 208-09
(N.Y. 2010) (holding that the family court has jurisdiction to impose a child support
obligation on the mother’s former same-sex partner).
94. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 672. The county’s district attorney brought the suit. Id. at
662.
95. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2004); Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social
Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010); Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms,
Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 415 (2005); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995); Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows:
Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1253, 1282-83 (2009); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 189, 193-94, 224-26 (2007).
96. Parental autonomy plays an important role in the privatization of dependency
because of the “exchange view” of parentage, which treats parental obligations
(including child support) as the moral basis of parental rights. See Katharine T.
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98 (1988). For other
“takes” on the relationship among parent, child, and state with respect to financial
support, see, for example, Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community?: An Evaluation
of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 92-117 (1998) (evaluating
different models for calculating child support); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2418-19 (1995) (proposing the use of
concepts from the law of agency and trusts to reconceptualize parental responsibilities).
97. See supra note 95 (citing authorities). Children born to never-married parents
tend to experience more disadvantages than their peers born into a marriage because
these children are more likely to be poor, more likely to need public assistance, and less
likely to receive support than children of previously married parents. See TIMOTHY S.
GRALL, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND
FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2007 (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-237.pdf; see also Daniel L. Hatcher, Child
Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal
Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007) (detailing how child
support policies are not successful and harm children and their families).
98. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 11 (proposing recognition of a broad range of
family arrangements); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) (proposing principles to govern financial
consequences and allocation of responsibilities for children upon the dissolution of
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emerges as a structure for making more and more of these arrangements
independent of public support.
III. TESTING THE READINGS AGAINST NEW CLASSIFICATIONS: CHILDREN
OF SEXUAL CONCEPTION AND CHILDREN CONCEIVED WITHOUT SEX
If the Supreme Court’s rulings on illegitimacy decreased marriage’s
legal salience, contemporary scholarship has decreased marriage’s
importance to family law theory99 and to law reform.100 At the same time,
empirical data show marriage’s decreasing prevalence in lived experience
and in public opinion about family life—with only 52% of adults married
in 2008 (compared to 72% in 1960),101 41% of children born to unmarried
women in 2008 (compared to 5% in 1960),102 and a majority of survey
respondents defining “family” to include various departures from the
traditional norm of a married couple with children.103 Meanwhile, with the
advent of constitutionally protected access to contraception,104 legalized
abortion,105 and the proliferation of ARTs,106 sex and reproduction now
represent quite distinct activities and objectives.
With the fading prominence of marriage and reproductive sex in all
facets of family law, other classifications and points of distinction become
more visible. Although the “new illegitimacy” prompting this symposium
stems from the reinvigorated emphasis on parental marital status in recent
marriages and some nonmarital relationships). For some of the advantages for children
in recognizing multiple parents, see Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How
American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (2008); Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple
Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007); Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth:
Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 909 (2006);
Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 327-32
(2007).
99. E.g., Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31
(2006); Laura T. Kessler, New Frontiers in Family Law, in TRANSCENDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 226 (Martha
Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) (examining trends in contemporary family law);
Rosenbury, supra note 95.
100. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 98.
101. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES
21 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends2010-families.pdf.
102. Id. at 54.
103. Id. at 40 (“Nearly nine-in-ten Americans (88%) say a childless married couple
is a family, and nearly as many say a single parent raising at least one child (86%) and
an unmarried couple with children (80%) are families. A smaller majority say a gay or
lesbian couple raising at least one child is a family (63%).”).
104. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007).
106. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); Raftapol v. Raney, 12 A.3d
783 (Conn. 2011); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
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cases about same-sex couples,107 other contemporary classifications of
children raise similarly vexing questions. This Part tests the various
readings of the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents by analyzing what
emerges as possibly an even “newer illegitimacy”: the increasingly notable
legal differentiation between nonmarital children based on the
circumstances of their conception, either through heterosexual intercourse
or through ARTs. Does the truism acknowledged by the Supreme Court,
“no child is responsible for his birth,”108 cast doubt on the doctrinal
divergences currently dictated by the method of conception?
The following analysis yields two important insights for our
understanding of illegitimacy both old and new. First, the regulation of sex
persists as a governmental purpose, trumping other family law policies that
have garnered far more attention in scholarly and public discourse. Indeed,
child support may be conceptualized as a “tax” on heterosexual intercourse
that does not apply to conception by nonsexual means.109 Second, as it
always has been, parentage remains a legal construction; we cannot
eliminate the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy without
dismantling legal parentage altogether110—because legitimacy is simply a
way of expressing whom the law recognizes as a child’s legal parent, while
illegitimacy communicates the absence of legal recognition.
A. Complementary Readings: Children of Sex
In many cases, the three readings of the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy
cases—children’s equality, parental identification, and personal
responsibility—work together seamlessly. For all practical purposes, in
terms of access to support and other benefits, parental marital status has
become irrelevant for children conceived by heterosexual intercourse.
Consider as an illustration Dubay v. Wells,111 a case about support
obligations for a child conceived outside marriage. Here, Matthew Dubay
unsuccessfully challenged his legal status as the child’s father, despite
107. E.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010) (recognizing a
biological mother’s former partner as a parent, only because of the couple’s formal
civil union), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011); see The New “Illegitimacy”:
Revisiting Why Parentage Should Not Depend on Marriage, supra note 42.
108. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
109. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
110. On the dismantling of parentage, see Melissa Murray, The Networked Family:
Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV.
385, 453-54 (2008); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 60-62 (2008) (exploring this idea). On the disaggregation of the
“bundle” of parental rights and responsibilities, see Jacobs, My Two Dads, supra note
78. But see Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and Rights: The
Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend to Disaggregate Family
Status from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127 (2010) (questioning trend that would
sever rights from family status).
111. 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007).
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asserting that he had made clear his desire not to become a parent before
sexual intercourse with Lauren Wells and that he had relied on her
assurances about her infertility and her use of contraception as an extra
precautionary measure.112 Wells became pregnant, chose to carry the
pregnancy to term, and joined with the county to seek a paternity order and
child support after Dubay maintained his refusal to become a father.113
Once the paternity complaint and DNA evidence identified Matthew
Dubay as the child’s father, state law made him personally responsible for
child support, in turn achieving equality by according the child the same
treatment that would belong to a child born of “legitimate” parents.114 The
outcome, namely Matthew Dubay’s child support obligation, synthesizes
all three readings of the case law, notwithstanding his arguments about the
unfairness to him based not only on the circumstances of conception but
also on a woman’s post-conception opportunity to “opt out” of parenthood
by means of abortion or adoption surrender.115
Moreover, cases like Dubay demonstrate that under all three readings,
the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents leave ample room for state
efforts to channel and otherwise manage adult sexual activities so long as
children do not suffer a penalty. True, the judicial rhetoric in cases like
Dubay conveys a punitive tone, but the court directs it at the father, not the
child.116 For example, in a predecessor case in the same jurisdiction, relied
upon in Dubay,117 the court of appeals described child support as a tax on
conception and hence, implicitly, as a tax on heterosexual intercourse:
Child support has long been a tax fathers have had to pay in Western
112. Id. at 426.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Walsh v. Jodoin, 925 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 2007); Jackson v. Proctor,

801 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
115. Dubay contended that state law denied him equal protection by disallowing
men like him to extricate themselves from parenthood, while affording women the
choice of abortion or access to “safe havens” for surrendering a child for adoption. 506
F.3d at 428. He had publicized his case as an effort to secure “Roe v. Wade for men.”
See Ethan J. Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose (an Abortion)?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4,
2005, at 60; John Tierney, Men’s Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006,
select.nytimes.com/2006/01/10/opinion/10tierney.html; see also Melanie G. McCulley,
The Male Abortion: The Putative Father’s Right to Terminate His Interests In and
Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J. L. & POL’Y 1 (1998). On “safe haven” laws, see
Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, Abandoned Babies, Lost Fathers: Dangers in
Safe Haven Laws, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 335 (2006); Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven
Laws: Legislating a Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2006); Lucinda J.
Cornett, Note, Remembering the Endangered “Child”: Limiting the Definition of “Safe
Haven” and Looking beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 KY. L.J. 833 (2010).
116. This punitive tone no doubt traces back to the crime of nonsupport and criminal
bastardy proceedings. See KRAUSE, supra note 15, at 109-10, 153-56. For the history
of the crime of nonsupport and the development of the modern approach to child
support, see Drew D. Hansen, Note, The American Invention of Child Support:
Dependency and Punishment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1123 (1999).
117. 506 F.3d at 429-30.
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civilization. For reasons of child welfare and social utility, if not for
moral reasons, the biological relationship between a father and his
offspring—even if unwanted and unacknowledged—remains
constitutionally sufficient to support paternity tests and child support
requirements.118

Indeed, the child purportedly benefits from this tax on sex,119 if we accept
as a given the premise that the state itself will not pay support.
This analysis does not conflict with cases such as Stanley v. Illinois120 or
Caban v. Mohammed,121 in which the Supreme Court struck down laws that
disadvantaged unmarried fathers in their ability to protect their parental
rights, compared to married fathers and unmarried mothers. In both cases,
by emphasizing not just the financial support that these men had provided
but also the affective ties that they had developed with the children, the
Court reached results that protected the children’s own emotional bonds
and ensured relationship continuity.122 The Court’s failure to follow this
apparent path in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,123 when the Justices rejected a
challenge to the traditional presumption of legitimacy by a biological father
118. N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Dubay, 506 F.3d
at 430 (“[T]o the extent that Dubay claims that Michigan is not affording him equal
protection of the law by denying men, but not women, ‘the right to initiate consensual
sexual activity while choosing to not be a parent,’ . . . his argument must fail.”); Dubay
v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“The consequences of sexual
intercourse have always included conception, and the State has nothing to do with this
historical truism.”), aff’d 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); Child Support Enforcement
Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005) (“The father elected a course of
conduct inconsistent with the exercise of his right not to beget a child. The reproductive
consequences of his actions were imposed by the operation of nature, not statute.”).
119. But see, e.g., Hatcher, supra note 97 (questioning benefits to children). Cf.
Stephen L. Carter, As a Compromise, How About a Federal Sex Tax?, BLOOMBERG
VIEW, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-17/as-a-compromisehow-about-a-federal-sex-tax-stephen-l-carter.html (facetious proposal designed to
argue for separation between church and state).
120. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
121. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
122. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-53 (“We observe that the State registers no gain
towards its declared goals [of advancing child welfare and strengthening the minor’s
family ties] when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if
Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly
separates him from his family.”); see also Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 (“There is no reason
to believe that the Caban children—aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption
proceedings—had a relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and
concern of their father.”); id. at 393 (“In cases such as this, where the father has
established a substantial relationship with the child and has admitted his paternity, a
State should have no difficulty in identifying the father even of children born out of
wedlock.”).
123. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In this case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
California’s conclusive presumption of legitimacy, which recognized the mother and
her husband, not the biological father, as the child’s legal parents. Id. at 123-27
(plurality opinion). As legal parents, they had the authority to prevent all contact
between the child and the biological father even though the two had previously
developed a relationship, such that the child called him “Daddy.” See id. at 143-44
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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who had forged a relationship with his daughter, helps prove the point. In
this case, the biological father lost his bid for continued contact with the
child over the objection of the legal parents, the mother and her husband.
Pulling no punches in its punitive tone toward the adult members of the
“extraordinary” family in question,124 the Michael H. plurality opinion
presented the presumption of legitimacy as a means of serving the
particular child’s interests as well as those of society—with such interests
understood to be advanced by the preferred family form of marriage125 and
through the usual deference to the decisions of legal parents on behalf of
their children.126
Indeed, Michael H. demonstrates that when children’s equality, parental
identification, and personal responsibility can be secured through
traditional means, namely reliance on the marital family, laws that
disadvantage or penalize “illegitimate parents” can survive constitutional
scrutiny. Put differently, the Court has never questioned a state’s ability to
prefer and privilege marriage as the site of sexual relationships.127 Further,
nothing in the Court’s illegitimacy precedents challenges a state’s authority
to enact morality-based laws that discipline sex, even if more recent rulings
require a more nuanced analysis of such measures.128 Rather, a narrower
124. Id. at 113 (plurality opinion) (“The facts of this case are, we must hope,
extraordinary.”); cf. Ariela R. Dubler, Constructing the Modern American Family: The
Stories of Troxel v. Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, 107-08 (Carol Sanger ed.,
2008).
125. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-24, 123 n.3, 131 (plurality opinion) (invoking
traditional protection of the “unitary family” and “the integrity of the marital union” in
upholding the presumption of legitimacy); id. at 131 (rejecting the child’s equal
protection argument for a protected relationship with her genetic father because the law
makes her legitimate and recognizes her relationship with her legal father); see also id.
at 135 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the trial judge found that “the existence of
two (2) ‘fathers’ as male authority figures will confuse the child and be counterproductive to her best interests”).
126. Id. at 131-32 (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 6566 (2000) (plurality opinion) (protecting parental liberty to rear one’s children);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting parents’ “high duty” to prepare their
children for adult responsibilities and justifying parental authority over children based
on law’s recognition that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children”). The legal principle that the Constitution protects parents’
authority to direct a child’s upbringing dates back to earlier cases. See Pierce v. Soc’y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
127. Certainly, the equal protection analysis in Eisenstadt v. Baird, striking down
restrictions on access to birth control by unmarried individuals but not married
individuals, gestures toward a rule of government evenhandedness without regard to
marriage. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). Even if Eisenstadt once conveyed that promise,
however, certainly the myriad laws currently privileging marriage show how little has
changed in the interim. Indeed, in today’s challenges to laws excluding same-sex
couples from marriage, courts routinely cite the many legal consequences that
accompany marital status. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 903 n.28
(Iowa 2009) (“Plaintiffs identify over two hundred Iowa statutes affected by civilmarriage status . . . .”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56
(Mass. 2003) (noting that “‘hundreds of statutes’ are related to marriage and to marital
benefits” and listing examples).
128. In striking down the Texas criminal ban on same-sex sodomy, Lawrence v.
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lesson emerges from the three readings of the illegitimacy case law:
penalizing children is an impermissible means of implementing efforts to
shape parental sexual conduct and to send a moral message.129 By contrast,
laws penalizing the adultery of the father in Michael H. and disapproving
such conduct present no such problems,130 especially if the state steers clear
of criminal punishment.131
B. Apparently Conflicting Readings: Children of No Sex
Removing heterosexual intercourse from the fact pattern triggers a quite
different parentage rule for children conceived outside marriage.132 Sperm
donors need not pay the tax that sexually conceiving unmarried fathers
must pay.133 Rather, agreements between sperm donors and clinics or
between sperm donors and recipients ordinarily suffice to insulate a genetic
father from recognition as a legal father even if, as a consequence, the
child—born to an unmarried mother—will have no second parent and even
when the identity of the genetic father is not in doubt and a lawsuit claims
that the child needs economic support. Thus, when conception occurs by
ARTs, the compatibility of the three readings of the Court’s illegitimacy
case law unravels. Indeed, the parentage rule for many children conceived
by unmarried women via ARTs stands at odds with each of the three
readings, which simply do not apply when conception occurs without sex.

Texas found majoritarian morality an insufficient justification. 539 U.S. 558, 577-78
(2003) (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”). But, the majority’s
disclaimers signal significant limitations on the holding, see id. at 578, suggesting that
civil laws, as distinguished from criminal penalties, might well remain within
constitutional bounds. Moreover, even after Lawrence, the Justices have invoked
moral concerns to justify particular criminal abortion restrictions. Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962, 979 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
129. Some read Lawrence’s invalidation of a stigmatizing prohibition, 539 U.S. at
575, to reflect anti-subordination principles. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties
of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007).
This interpretation fits well with the conclusion that states may enact morality-based
laws so long as they do not single out a particular class for opprobrium—such as gays
and lesbians or children of unmarried parents.
130. Given the child’s status as “legitimate,” the Michael H. plurality saw no
discrimination against her, despite the state’s refusal to recognize her relationship with
her biological father. 491 U.S. at 131-32.
131. Whether or not the reasoning in Lawrence would invalidate criminal adultery
laws remains uncertain.
132. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the adults examined in this section do
not have sex at all or even that “sex” refers only to penile-vaginal penetration. Instead,
by my use of the term “no sex” or my effort to “remov[e] sexual intercourse from the
fact pattern,” I simply mean that the children in question are conceived without sex,
using ARTs, typically alternative insemination but sometimes by in vitro fertilization
(IVF) with donor sperm. Likewise, adults in the “sex” group presumably engage in a
variety of sexual activities apart from their participation in procreative intercourse.
133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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No doubt, the source of this particular parentage rule lies in the marital
paradigm assumed at the time that donor insemination first attracted legal
For married women using donor insemination, the
attention.134
presumption of legitimacy and principles of estoppel typically have made
her husband the legal father of the child, with the donor having no parental
status.135 A number of states enacted the codification of this approach
offered by the 1973 UPA, which expressly employed the language of
“husband” and “wife.”136 These authorities apparently believed that only
married women would use donor insemination or that the exclusion of
single women from the governing legal principle would confine the
practice to married couples. Of course, today we see widespread use of
ARTs by unmarried women, including single women and women in
relationships with other women that are not formally recognized.137
Although many states now have developed approaches that will recognize a
woman’s partner or former partner as a parent or quasi-parent under
appropriate circumstances,138 the subset of “illegitimate” children
conceived by donor insemination and born to single women have only one
legal parent.
For example, in In re K.M.H.,139 a divided Kansas Supreme Court
applied and upheld a state statute treating a sperm provider as “not the birth
father,” absent a written agreement to the contrary with the woman. In this
case, the uninformed failure of Daryl Hendrix (a gay man reportedly
hopeful about the opportunity to become a parent) to secure a written
agreement from Samantha Harrington naming him as birth father left
134. On the history of donor insemination, including the governing law, see Gaia
Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at
Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (2002).
135. The classic case is In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Surr. Ct.
1973).
136. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377, 407-08 (2001).
137. See, e.g., DIANE EHRENSAFT, MOMMIES, DADDIES, DONORS, SURROGATES:
ANSWERING TOUGH QUESTIONS AND BUILDING STRONG FAMILIES (2005); Jennifer
Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, (Magazine), at 44
(detailing the experiences of several single women who used donor insemination to
have children). Some same-sex relationships are not formally recognized because the
couple lives in a state that restricts legally sanctioned relationships to heterodyadic
marriages. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A (West, Westlaw through End of 2011
Session) (Virginia Marriage Amendment). Others are not formally recognized because
of the choice or inaction of one or both partners. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117
P.3d 660, 663 (Cal. 2005) (noting that the couple did not register as domestic partners).
138. E.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666; C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Me.
2004); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 98, § 2.03(1) (2002) (formulating criteria for
“parent[s] by estoppel” and “de facto parent[s]”). But see, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857
N.E.2d 1061, 1073-74 (Mass. 2006) (declining to recognize parentage by estoppel);
Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (declining to recognize de
facto parentage).
139. 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007).
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Hendrix with no paternal status as to the resulting twins even though he
went all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court in an effort to claim parental
rights and accept parental responsibilities, including support obligations.140
In rejecting his arguments, the K.M.H. majority interpreted the statute to
advance state interests in “predictability, clarity, and enforceability.”141
Explaining that the statute afforded Hendrix an opportunity to bargain for
parental rights before providing his semen for Harrington’s insemination,
the majority asserted that “the male’s ability to insist on father status
effectively disappears once he donates sperm.”142 A divided Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reached a similar result in Ferguson v. McKiernan,143 a suit
for child support in which the court enforced an agreement relieving the
man of all parental obligations that the parties entered before in vitro
fertilization (IVF).144
In these cases, then, the children each have one legal parent—precisely
the outcome that Matthew Dubay unsuccessfully sought to achieve for his
sexually conceived child and, according to some authorities, precisely the
disadvantage that “illegitimacy” encompasses.145 An even more telling
illustration of this differential treatment becomes apparent in a recent
Indiana case, In re Paternity of M.F.,146 a suit for support for two children
whom J.F., an unmarried mother, bore during a long-term committed
relationship with a same-sex partner.147 After she and her partner split up,
J.F. and the county joined to sue W.M., the children’s genetic father.148
W.M. argued that he was a sperm donor who had helped conceive the
children by alternative insemination and cited an agreement with J.F.
relieving him of support obligations in exchange for his semen.149 J.F.
counter-argued that W.M. had failed to prove that conception did not occur
140. See In re K.M.H., 129 S. Ct. 36 (2008) (denying certiorari); Man Fights for
CITY
(Nov.
23,
2007),
Parental
Rights,
KCTV5-KANSAS
http://www.kctv5.com/news/14673759/detail.html
(accessed
archive
at
http://www.ottawamenscentre.com/news/20071123_rights.htm).
See generally
Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? How Written Agreement
Statutes are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parenting Issues in Assisted
Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 340 (2009) (analyzing the case and the policy
issues it raises).
141. 169 P.3d at 1039.
142. Id.
143. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
144. Id.
145. See Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1249 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
majority’s approach violates state law prescribing legitimacy for all children); see also
supra note 69 and accompanying text. For a more detailed exploration of some of the
contrasts in sex and no-sex cases, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Reproduction and
Regret, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 255, 329-33 (2011).
146. 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
147. Id. at 1257.
148. Id. at 1258.
149. Id. at 1257.
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by sexual intercourse and that, in any event, such agreement would be
unenforceable in violation of public policy—an invalid attempt by adults to
bargain away the rights of these children.150
As the court acknowledged, both parties had some Indiana law on their
respective sides: For conception by alternative insemination, a contract
relieving the donor of support obligations is valid and enforceable, if a
physician performed the procedure.151
For conception by sexual
intercourse, such agreements are invalid and unenforceable.152 J.F’s ability
to secure a child support order against W.M. would depend entirely on the
method of conception, of which there was no proof in this case. There was
a donor agreement entered into evidence, however, that clearly applied to
the first child.153 Because J.F., the plaintiff, was seeking to avoid the
contract, she bore the burden of proof but failed to carry it because she
could not prove conception by sexual intercourse; hence, she lost, leaving
the first child without support from W.M.154 For the second child,
however, the agreement did not clearly apply, so the court remanded with
instructions that the lower court grant J.F.’s petition to establish paternity,
150. Id. at 1260.
151. Id. at 1259-60. The Kansas statute applied in K.M.H. contains this requirement.

In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007) (quoting a statute, which requires
“semen provided to a licensed physician”); see also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal.
Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). In M.F., the majority also emphasized the participation of a
physician. 938 N.E.2d at 1261. Of course, self-insemination is easily performed. See
Renate Duelli Klein, Doing It Ourselves: Self-Insemination, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN:
WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 382 (Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein & Shelley
Minden eds., 1984); Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The
Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 (1991). The physician’s
participation performs a valuable evidentiary function, however, preventing any dispute
about the method of conception (sexual versus medical) from devolving into a “he
said/she said” argument, as M.F. illustrates. Indeed, in M.F., both the majority and
dissenting opinions agree that “informal, spur-of-the moment written instrument[s]”
should not relieve a biological parent of support duties. 938 N.E.2d at 1261; id. at
1264 (Crone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For another case with
evidentiary complications, see Adams-Hall v. Adams, 3 A.3d 1096 (Del. 2010); see
also Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations
Between the Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 949, 984 (2009) (criticizing physician-participation requirement while
explaining its evidentiary purpose); cf. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 67-68 (Supp. 2011) (“The new Act does not continue the
requirement [in the 1973 version] that the donor provide the sperm to a licensed
physician.”). Note that, today, some authorities prefer the term “alternative
insemination” to “artificial insemination.” E.g., MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING
BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND UNWED PARENTS 80
(2001).
152. M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1260; see, e.g., Straub v. B.M.T. ex rel. Todd, 645 N.E.2d
597, 601 (Ind. 1994) (rejecting father’s contention of “artificial insemination by
intercourse”); State ex rel. Kayla T. v. Risinger, 731 N.W.2d 892 (Neb. 2007)
(rejecting a genetic father’s argument that an agreement with the mother relieves him
of support obligations to a child they conceived in a sexual relationship).
153. M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1262.
154. Id. at 1260-61.
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based on a presumption of conception by sexual intercourse in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.155 The outcome: two siblings, both conceived
in the same intimate same-sex partnership and with the same genetic
parents, but one sibling has one legal parent and the other has two, with the
different treatment based on the method of conception and its proof.156
In all three cases, K.M.H., Ferguson, and M.F., there were judges who
did not agree with the majority. These minority opinions contended that
parents cannot bargain away the rights of their children,157 that a focus on
the interests of the children would have compelled a different conclusion,158
and that family law policies requiring child support trump contract law
policies honoring agreements.159 Examined through the lens of the
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents, these minority opinions
collectively express concern that the circumstances of a child’s birth—or
conception—determine the recognition (or not) of a second legal parent.
Although these cases appear to stand at odds with the Court’s
illegitimacy precedents and Dubay,160 calls for a new parentage rule for
donor-conceived children of single women remain quite limited and have
acquired little traction. Over a decade ago, Marsha Garrison challenged the
doctrine that permits a one-parent family through alternative
insemination.161 Yet recent cases, such as K.M.H., Ferguson, and M.F.,
continue to reinscribe this doctrine, notwithstanding Garrison’s proposal
for two parents for every child. In addition to Garrison’s targeted critique
of principles of parentage for donor-conceived children, one can find
broader arguments for enshrining the heterodyadic162 marital family as the
norm for all—by means of a proposed understanding of parenthood that
155. Id. at 1261 n.1, 1263.
156. Id.
157. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1249 (Pa. 2007) (Eakin, J., dissenting)

(“I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion appellee can bargain away her
children’s right to support from their father merely because he fathered the children
through a clinical sperm donation.”).
158. Id. at 1249-51 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (asserting that children’s best interests
require support obligation by the genetic father); In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1051
(Kan. 2007) (Hill, J., dissenting) (“Who speaks for the children in these
proceedings?”).
159. M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1264 (Crone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Crone, however, does leave open the possibility that, in narrow circumstances
and subject to clearly defined requirements, the donor might not have support
obligations. Id. at 1264-65.
160. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
161. Garrison wrote that in the context of sexual conception, “our legal system
grants no parent, male or female, the right to be a sole parent.” Marsha Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 906 (2000). Thus, she argued that she could find
no justification for “a policy that would invariably deprive technologically conceived
children of two legal parents.” Id. at 907.
162. See Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 passim (2010) (using this term).
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would integrate legal, social, and biological elements.163 Proponents of this
approach urge family law to privilege this integrative model and to limit
recognition of departures from this norm.164 Yet the prospect of moving to
a legal regime based on these values seems slim, given family law’s
trajectory, with the increasing authorization of same-sex marriage165 and
recognition of an array of nontraditional, informal domestic arrangements,
many of which include children parented by adults in the absence of any
biological relationship.166
Family law’s modern embrace of new family forms finds strong support
among advocates of the principle of children’s equality rooted in the
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents.167 For example, Nancy Polikoff
invokes the illegitimacy case law168 to make a powerful argument for
family law to abandon marriage as the “dividing line” for official
recognition and the distribution of rights and benefits169 and, instead, to
adopt a “valuing-all-families legal system.”170 Polikoff proceeds to
propound several guiding principles, including “plac[ing] the needs of
children first”171 and “support[ing] children in all family forms.”172
Similarly, Courtney Joslin criticizes the refusal of some jurisdictions to
extend the parentage doctrines governing married couples’ children to the
ARTs-conceived children of unmarried couples, including same-sex
163. E.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 155-57 (2007);
ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE, THE REVOLUTION IN
PARENTHOOD: THE EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND
CHILDREN’S NEEDS, 10-15 (2006) (a survey of relevant developments in the United
States and abroad, led by principal investigator Elizabeth Marquardt); Karen Clark &
Elizabeth Marquardt, The Sperm Donor Kids Are Not Really All Right: A New Study
(June
14,
2010,
11:23
AM),
Shows
They
Suffer,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/id/2256212/.
164. See generally WHAT IS PARENTHOOD? CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE
FAMILY (Linda McClain & Daniel Cere eds.) (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
165. In 2012, Washington became the seventh state to allow access to marriage by
same-sex couples. See Reuters, Washington; Gay Marriage Legalized, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/washington-gay-marriagelegalized.html?scp=2&sq=marriage&st=cse.
166. E.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(recognizing three legal parents, former lesbian partners and their sperm donor); N.R.
Kleinfeld, And Baby Makes Four, and Complications, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/nyregion/an-american-family-mom-sperm-donorlover-child.html (describing the informal familial arrangement of a single mother, her
son. and a gay male couple). See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION, supra note 98 (proposing principles to govern the financial consequences
and allocation of responsibilities for children upon dissolution of marriages and some
nonmarital relationships); supra notes 137-38 (citing additional relevant authorities).
167. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
168. See POLIKOFF, supra note 11, at 129-31.
169. Id. at 126-31.
170. Id. at 132.
171. Id. at 138-39.
172. Id. at 140-41.
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couples.173 While ARTs-conceived children of married couples have two
legal parents, the same result does not always obtain for ARTs-conceived
children of unmarried couples. Joslin challenges such discrimination
because it disadvantages the children of nontraditional families and
undermines these children’s wellbeing by denying them some “critical
financial protections and benefits,” in particular, resources that an
additional parent could provide.174
These arguments, which sound in equality and recall the seductively
incontestible idea that no child should be penalized because of the
circumstances of his or her birth,175 are compelling. Yet, taken literally and
pushed to their logical conclusion, these arguments invite questions about
another class of children: the ARTs-conceived children of single women.
Because of the choices of their mothers and their genetic fathers, these
children have no second legal parent or the “critical financial protections
and benefits”176 that a second legal parent could provide. Does the
reasoning of Polikoff and Joslin require recognition of sperm donors as
legal parents in such cases, notwithstanding the contrary intent of the adults
who entered into the reproductive arrangement? Certainly, an emphasis on
reproductive or family autonomy would provide an easy answer: no.
Polikoff and Joslin, however, emphasize children’s equality177 and urge law
to make irrelevant situations over which a child has no control. Although
the advocacy and scholarship of both Polikoff and Joslin leave no doubt
that they contemplate something other than a purely genetic approach to
legal parentage,178 their work necessarily poses a challenge: how to
173. Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177 (2010).
174. Id. at 1195; see id. at 1177 (“The Supreme Court has declared that children
should not be penalized based on the circumstances of their birth.”); id. at 1228 (“Over
the past forty years, many of the laws that once penalized children born outside of
marriage have been eliminated or at least mitigated.”); see also Mary Patricia Byrn,
From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 214-20 (2007) (citing the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents
to criticize the failure of the UPA to recognize a mother’s partner as second parent of
ARTs-conceived child); Maldonado, supra note 64, at 386-87 (urging “equality for all
children . . . by extending the presumption of parentage to nonmarital children in cases
where a person has held the child out as his or her own regardless of a biological link”).
All of these authorities fail to explore the apparent inequality resulting from parentage
laws applicable to single women (that is, those without partners) who use donor
insemination, however.
175. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
176. Joslin, supra note 173, at 1195.
177. This emphasis on children’s equality is reflected in the announcement for this
symposium. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
178. For representative examples of such scholarship, see Courtney G. Joslin,
Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the Well-Being of Children, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81 (2011); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt
Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-first
Century, 5 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009).
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reconcile the Court’s illegitimacy precedents with due respect for families
that do not conform to traditional norms, in particular single women who
use ARTs for the purpose of creating a one-parent family.179
C. Sex, Nature, and Law
The challenge posed by the contrasting parentage rules for two groups of
children conceived outside marriage, those from sex and those without sex,
highlights three significant propositions. All three illuminate not only the
conceptualizations of illegitimacy, both old and new, but also the
understanding of family law itself.
First, the regulation of sex remains an important function of family law,
and the policy of personal responsibility, with its connection to
heterosexual intercourse, represents a modern instantiation of this
longstanding legal enterprise. The absence of support responsibilities for
sperm donors reinforces this conclusion; in such cases, reproduction occurs
without sex—leaving the state without the regulatory interest so strongly
applied and enforced for sexually conceived children.180 Indeed, the
divergence in the treatment of nonmarital children, depending on the
method of conception, reveals that the regulation of sex has far more
explanatory payoff than the privatization of dependency when it comes to
identifying the core value or policy of contemporary family law. The fact
that family law permits some children conceived by donor insemination to
have only one legal parent, even when they might need support, as in
Ferguson and M.F.,181 confirms the limits of the privatization of
dependency as family law’s theoretical foundation.182 The regulation of
sex, however, harmonizes the determinative role played by the method of
conception, providing a rationale for the unequal and hence apparently
anomalous outcomes for the two groups of children.
Second, to the extent the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents focus
on condemnation, punishments, and penalties imposed on undeserving
children,183 the Supreme Court’s own bounded understanding of such
179. See Egan, supra note 137.
180. Some readers will recognize the resemblance of this move to a part of the

methodology of governmental interest analysis for resolving choice of law issues. See,
e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171 (1959).
181. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
182. Hence, I disagree with Katharine Baker’s assertion that “there is a growing
consensus that family law as a discipline is shifting from a set of rules designed
primarily to regulate sexual relationships between adults to a set of rules designed to
regulate parental relationships between adults and children.” See generally Baker,
supra note 89, at 651. I would still place sex at the center of family law. See Appleton,
supra note 12, at 272-85.
183. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of
illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible
liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of
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concepts helps explain why children conceived without sex who have only
one legal parent suffer no penalty under the prevailing doctrines. In several
different cases arising in diverse settings—from challenges to funding
schemes that subsidize childbirth for indigent women but not their
medically necessary abortions184 to insufficient protection provided by the
state in response to family violence185—a majority of the Court has taken a
very narrow view of state action.186 Using this narrow view, the Court fails
to see (or to goes out of its way to downplay) the state’s participation in
creating the contested situation.
A few notable opinions illustrate the pattern. For example, in ruling that
the Constitution does not require state funding for medically necessary
abortions for poor women even when the state pays for childbirth, the
Court reasoned that no deprivation of liberty occurs when government fails
to “remove [obstacles] not of its own creation.”187 As the opinion explains,
“[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to
enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather
of her indigency.”188 The Court accepted a woman’s poverty and,
implicitly, her health problems warranting abortion189 as features of a
“natural”190 status quo that the state did not cause and thus has no
affirmative obligation to address. In the process, the Court considered
irrelevant the government support provided for poor women who carried
their pregnancies to term.191 The Court has used similar reasoning to find
an infant is illogical and unjust.”).
184. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
185. E.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989);
see also Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
186. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
187. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 339-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the health conditions that
may make an abortion medically necessary).
190. I put “natural” and related terms in quotation marks throughout this discussion
to emphasize the indeterminacy of the term’s application.
191. See id. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan explained:
[W]hat the Court fails to appreciate is that it is not simply the woman’s
indigency that interferes with her freedom of choice, but the combination of
her own poverty and the Government’s unequal subsidization of abortion and
childbirth. A poor woman in the early stages of pregnancy confronts two
alternatives: she may elect either to carry the fetus to term or to have an
abortion. . . . By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and
none of the expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the Government
literally makes an offer that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse. . . .
[A]s a practical matter, many poverty-stricken women will choose to carry
their pregnancy to term simply because the Government provides funds for the
associated medical services, even though these same women would have
chosen to have an abortion if the Government had also paid for that option, or
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no state interference with constitutionally protected interests in cases of
family violence even when state actors were inextricably involved in the
events leading up to the violence.192 Thus, according to the Court, family
violence arises exclusively from “natural” (not state) causes, even when
child welfare authorities made the decisions to return a child to an abusive
parent’s custody and to keep him there193 or the police did not respond to
calls to enforce a judicial order of protection, despite a statute making
enforcement mandatory.194
In failing to acknowledge the state’s participation and in naturalizing the
consequences that ensue in such cases, the Court has rejected arguments
that the state is imposing a penalty for choosing abortion195 or that the state
is depriving persons of constitutionally protected interests because of its
role in the physical harm they have suffered as a result of family
violence.196 Under this circumscribed analysis and the baseline that it
uncritically assumes, a penalty or deprivation occurs only when the state
interferes with or worsens the “natural” status quo for an individual or
class.197 In setting a boundary between private and public, the Court has
chosen an expansive view of the former and a blinkered view of the latter.
The Court’s general approach, problematic and contrived as it might be,
reaches beyond abortion and family violence. In particular, it has
implications for parentage and the status of the ARTs-conceived children

Id.

indeed if the Government had stayed out of the picture altogether and had
defrayed the costs of neither procedure.

192. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
193. Id. at 193-94; cf. id. at 205-06 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing state

action in the facts of the case).
194. Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751-59 (2005); cf. id. at
788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing Gonzales’s entitlement to protection because
“the statute’s guarantee of police enforcement is triggered by, and operates only in
reference to, a judge’s granting of a restraining order in favor of an identified
‘protected person’”).
195. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19 (explaining that disqualification from other
benefits for engaging in protected activity would constitute a penalty, but failure to
fund protected activity is not); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977)
(explaining why the state has not imposed a penalty in declining to fund elective
abortions, while funding care incident to carrying to term and delivery).
196. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191; see Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 764-69 (rejecting
arguments that a Colorado statute gave a mother an entitlement to enforcement of a
restraining order in the face of fatal violence by the children’s father, so that police
inaction did not violate due process).
197. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive
Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights
Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981). Contrast
the laws challenged in the abortion-funding cases, in which the Court found no penalty,
with a mandatory maternity leave from employment, which the Court described as
“penaliz[ing] the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child.” Cleveland Bd. of Ed.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974). See also Perry v. Brown, 2012 WL 372713 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding California’s Proposition 8 unconstitutional because it withdraws
from gays and lesbians the access to marriage that they previously enjoyed).
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of single mothers. The Court’s reasoning suggests that deciding whether a
particular parentage scheme unjustly penalizes a class of children or
unfairly deprives them of a second parent remains very much an open
question, one that depends on identifying (or assuming) the baseline or the
“natural” state of affairs. Accordingly, we must return to the illegitimacy
precedents to examine what the Court regarded as the “natural baseline” in
terms of parentage for children born outside marriage so that laws robbing
a given relationship of legal force would have been seen as penalizing these
children. Put differently, the question becomes whether the Court
envisioned genetic paternity as the “natural baseline” in the illegitimacy
case law.
This inquiry in turn reveals the third significant proposition: parentage is
anything but “natural.” Traditionally, as well as now, genetics do not
determine parentage,198 and many observers doubt the wisdom and
desirability of reforms that would achieve such ends.199 In overturning
discrimination based on illegitimacy, in fact, the Court has made clear the
insufficiency of genetic connection alone for constitutional protection.200
For example, the Court upheld the required performance of certain formal
acts for an unmarried father to be recognized as a legal parent, such as
obtaining a judicial order of filiation.201 Similarly, the Court developed
what some observers call the “biology plus” test.202 By stating that
biological connection merely creates a unique opportunity for achieving
recognized parental status and requiring genetic fathers to undertake
supplementary paternal conduct in order to gain constitutionally protected
parental rights in the absence of marriage, the Court has left no doubt that a
state may refuse to recognize a biological father as a legal parent when he
merely provides genetic material.203
198. For example, during slavery, law ignored the male owner’s genetic connection
to children conceived through sexual intercourse, forcible and otherwise, with his
female slaves and determined the status of children exclusively through gestation. E.g.,
ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 23, 29, 267-68 (1997); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (“Illegitimacy is a legal construct, not a natural trait.”); Kerry
Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric
of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 9 (2009) (“Marriage [and
illegitimacy] thus functioned . . . as a way for men to maintain sexual freedom without
adverse consequences to themselves or their (official) families.”).
199. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 89; Jacobs, Paternity Fraud Claims, supra note 78;
Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246 (2006).
200. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
201. Id. at 275-76 (upholding a requirement of a judicial order of filiation for a child
to inherit from his or her unmarried father by intestate succession).
202. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
203. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). These cases regard biological connection as merely providing an opportunity
to develop a relationship. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
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Today, the rise of doctrines that determine parentage according to
function and performance push this approach beyond the notion of
“biology plus.” The more contemporary, functional approaches use
performance not as an addition to genetic connection but as a substitute for
it204—just as the presumption of legitimacy always did, with marriage as
the required performance. Indeed, albeit with divided opinions, a majority
in Michael H. v. Gerald D. upheld the presumption of legitimacy against
the constitutional challenge of a genetic father and daughter, who sought
recognition of their relationship.205 As the Michael H. plurality opinion
explained in rejecting the child’s claim to a relationship with her biological
father, over the objection of the mother and the mother’s husband, this
legitimate child suffers no illegitimacy-based discrimination, and
“[i]llegitimacy is a legal construct, not a natural trait.”206 Now, in some
jurisdictions, the very traditional presumption of legitimacy extends to
nontraditional families, recognizing a mother’s wife or domestic partner as
a legal parent.207 Further, the terms “natural father” and “natural child”
legally apply even in the absence of genetic relationship.208
The UPA has followed a similar path. The 1973 UPA set forth a
network of parentage presumptions applicable to children to whom the
presumption of legitimacy did not apply.209 This network included
conduct-based triggers, most notably a presumption of paternity arising
from a man’s receiving a child into his home and holding the child out as
his own.210 A revised UPA, first promulgated in 2000, attempted to
respond to improved genetic testing and the proliferation of ARTs.211 This
204. E.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Shondel J. v. Mark
D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006).
205. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In addition to Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion for four Justices, rejecting the arguments of the genetic father and
child, Justice Stevens concurred in the result on the theory that the genetic father had
received all the process he was due and that, on the merits, his claims were insufficient
to overcome the presumption in this case or to gain access to the child over the legal
parents’ objections. See id. at 132-36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 131.
207. E.g., Charisma R. v. Kristina S., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26 (Ct. App. 2009), overruled
in part by Reid v. Google, Inc., 235 P.3d 988 (Cal. 2010); Shineovich v. Shineovich,
214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). See generally Appleton, supra note 14 (exploring the
application of the presumption of legitimacy to same-sex couples); Jeffrey A. Parness,
Civil Unions and Parenthood at Birth, 99 ILL. B.J. 472 (2011) (exploring how legal
parenthood should be assigned at birth to children born into civil unions).
208. E.g., Nicholas H. v. Kimberly H., 46 P.3d 932, 933-34 (Cal. 2002).
209. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 393-94 (2001); see also UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 22-23 (Supp. 2011).
210. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (1973), 9B U.L.A 393-94 (2001) (the
presumption of paternity applies if “while the child is under the age of majority, [the
man] receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child”).
211. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 501, 701 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 329,
354 (2001).
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version retained the presumption of legitimacy based on marriage but
initially eliminated the “holding out” trigger for paternity on the theory that
genetic testing would identify the fathers of children born outside
marriage.212 The drafters, however, then became aware that the elimination
of this provision “could result in differential treatment of children born to
unmarried parents.”213 In 2002, in order to “more fully serve the [UPA’s]
goal of treating nonmarital and marital children equally,” the drafters
restored the “holding out” provision, albeit with a new durational
requirement.214
Despite concerns about equal treatment, however, all the versions of the
UPA specify that a donor of genetic material is not a parent, so long as
certain requirements are satisfied,215 and the updated UPA’s treatment of
ARTs contemplates situations when the child will have only one legal
parent, a mother.216 Moreover, the UPA makes clear that such provisions
do not apply to children conceived by sexual intercourse.217
As this brief survey reveals, parentage has been and remains a legal
construction, a social and political choice, not a biological inevitability.
The state is inextricably involved, determining the criteria that make one a
parent.218 Given the long history of the presumption of legitimacy in
marriage, it should come as no surprise that alternative bases of parentage
still include one or more ingredients that remind us of this legally favored
relationship: sex, care, support, co-residence, and/or other familial
performance. Marriage casts a shadow even if its formalities are no longer
essential for family recognition, as various observers have noted in
evaluating contemporary functional approaches.219
212. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 311-12 (2001)
(current version at 9B U.L.A. 23-24 (Supp. 2011)).
213. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 23-24 (Supp.
2011).
214. Id.
215. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 501 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 329 (2001); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 407-08 (2001).
216. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 67-68 (Supp.
2011) (“[T]his section shields all donors . . . from parenthood in all situations in which
either a married woman or a single woman conceives a child through ART with the
intent to be the child’s parent, either by herself or with a man. . . .”); see also id. §
704(a), 9B U.L.A. 69 (“Consent by a woman, and a man who intends to be a parent of
a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction[,] must be in a record signed by the
woman and the man. This requirement does not apply to a donor.”).
217. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354 (2001)
(“Article 7 [entitled ‘Child of Assisted Reproduction’] applies only to children born as
the result of assisted reproduction technologies; a child conceived by sexual intercourse
is not covered by this article, irrespective of the alleged intent of the parties.”).
218. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 26 (2006)
(explaining that the state is always involved in identifying parents, even when it
chooses to rely on biological criteria).
219. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A
Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L.
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The court of appeals in Dubay emphasized the state’s role in assigning
parental status,220 correcting the lower court’s erroneous declaration that
the state had nothing to do with the unintended father’s predicament.221
Although the dissent in M.F. raised questions about the refusal to recognize
the sperm donor as the father of one child,222 we might ask why the
mother’s former partner, who would have been recognized as a parent in
several other jurisdictions,223 bore no responsibility for support. To say
that this child in M.F. or the twins in K.M.H. and Ferguson suffer a
discriminatory penalty based on the circumstances of birth, in
contravention of the Supreme Court’s illegitimacy precedents, would
require identifying a “natural” status quo that the state has infringed or
worsened. The very concept of parentage defies such efforts: a parentchild relationship exists only when the state says it does.
Perhaps, however, the analysis need not remain so hopelessly circular.
The Court’s emphasis on parental performance in the “biology plus”
cases,224 the role of conduct in the other illegitimacy precedents, and the
rise of contemporary functional approaches to parentage all suggest that
some hints of the “natural” family, the status quo, or the baseline might
well be found in the ongoing domestic or domestic-like interactions that
adults and children share. Again, although marriage is not required, it
provides a template for evaluating function and performance.225 When the
state acts to disrupt or negate these subsisting arrangements, as it did in
discounting the active role that Louise Levy,226 Peter Stanley,227 and Abdiel
Caban228 had played in the children’s lives, the state penalizes those
children, according to the Court. By contrast, when the state chooses not to
recognize a genetic tie, that is, when the genetic tie provides the only
connection between an adult and a child, the state’s inaction works no
interference and it imposes no penalty, in the Court’s view. Under this
analysis, the one-parent families created by donor-insemination laws do no
represent a “newer illegitimacy.” These were always one-parent families,
so the state took nothing away.
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CONCLUSION
In overturning many laws that made marriage the dividing line for access
to rights and benefits, especially for children, the Supreme Court’s
illegitimacy precedents invite critiques of all laws that classify on the basis
of marriage and that attach material consequences to the circumstances of a
child’s birth. The equalizing impulses at work here, however, often prompt
us to forget the critical role of sex and sexual morality in illegitimacy.
Even with the demise of many instantiations of the “old illegitimacy,” the
state’s interest in regulating sex persists, with legal reforms extending
support to children born to unmarried parents often framed not just as
means for privatizing dependency but also as regulations of sex. That such
reforms do not apply to a subset of children born to unmarried parents,
namely children conceived without sex, underscores the enduring power of
the state’s interest regulating sex, while also exposing the limited
explanatory value of children’s equality and the privatization of
dependency in our efforts to make sense of family law’s modern trajectory.
Hence, a regime that makes marriage the dividing line has given way to
one that makes sex the dividing line. Should this classification trouble us,
given that a child’s parentage with all its legal consequences will depend
on the circumstances of conception, in apparent contravention of the
Supreme Court’s illegitimacy case law?
One short response to this question would challenge, as a normative
matter, the state’s continuing effort to discipline sex, notwithstanding
judicial rhetoric protecting sexual liberty and privacy.229 Another short
response would emphasize the autonomy of those who use donor
insemination and other ARTs, including women who choose to have a
child without a second parent.230 The first response is unsatisfactory
because it fails to differentiate this particular regulation of sex, child
support obligations for sexually conceived children, from all the others
imposed by family law, which would require a thorough rethinking.231 The
second is unsatisfactory because reproductive autonomy applies as well to
sexual procreation, precisely the context in which the state imposes a “tax”
in the form of child support, regardless of the choices of the participants.232
Moreover, neither of these responses focuses on the children, whose equal
treatment stood out as such a commanding consideration in the illegitimacy

229. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
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(Md. 2007) (recognizing the intended father as the sole legal parent upon the birth of a
child born pursuant to a gestational surrogacy agreement).
231. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 12, at 272-85.
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precedents.
Considering the impact on children of the sex/no sex dividing line
requires a longer response that in turn raises additional questions. As this
Article has shown, determining when a particular connection between an
adult and child receives legal recognition always constitutes a policy
choice. Indeed, some children might have two legal parents, others
three,233 and still others only one. Should we consider some of these
children “legitimate” and other “illegitimate”? Which ones? Some
children have adults who play important roles in their lives but the law of
parentage excludes them, such as grandparents, stepparents, nannies, and
foster parents.234 We can probably eliminate the last vestiges of
illegitimacy—the law’s failure to acknowledge the reality of a particular
child’s lived experience no matter how unique—only by dismantling
parentage altogether.235
Meanwhile, however, the choices that law makes about legal
parentage—perhaps a less troubling and provocative term than
“illegitimacy,” even if the inquiries share much in common—not only
shape our understanding of family by acknowledging some connections
and dismissing others; in doing so, these choices also construct the
identities of the affected individuals, adults and children alike.
In turn, these legal and policy choices reveal family law’s values and
concerns, recalling the casebook editors’ claim many years ago that the
“law of illegitimacy typifies the whole subject of family law.”236 To the
extent that this insight remains valid, then, modern doctrines of parentage
expose family law’s continuing interest in regulating sex even more than
equalizing children and privatizing dependency.
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